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We quantify the probability that a sovereign defaults on repayment obligations in foreign currency. Adopting the 
structural approach as first introduced by Merton, we consider the sovereigns ability-to-pay, characterised by the sum 
of discounted future payment surpluses, as the underlying process. Its implicit volatility is inferred from market 
spreads. We demonstrate for the case of Latin America and Russia that our approach indicates default events well in 
advance of agencies and markets. 
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 2 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
1 Introduction
In this paper, we present a model to analyse sovereign risk. Sovereign risk
is deﬁned as the risk that the sovereign declares to be unable to fulﬁl its
repayment obligations in a foreign currency which leads to the sovereign’s
default on liabilities in foreign currency. The model is based on the struc-
tural approach to evaluate corporate risk, an approach which dates back to
Merton(1974). We will present an adaptation of the Merton model for
determining a sovereign’s probability of default, PoD.
A default results if the sovereign’s ability-to-pay is smaller than the value
of the repayment requirements in foreign currency. Thereby, the ability-
to-pay is understood as a stochastic variable which follows an Ito process.
We assume that the value of repayment obligations at some future time T
is publicly known. Then, for any time t prior to T, one can estimate the
PoD at T if the parameters of the Ito process as well as of the sovereign’s
ability-to-pay at time t,At,a r ek n o w n .
Modelling a sovereign’s ability-to-pay is a challenging task. The approach
proposed here relies on what is taken as value of the ﬁrm within the theory
of the ﬁrm. Though there is no directly observable market value of a country
available, we can adopt the idea of discounted future net incomes which limit
the ﬁrm’s - here: the sovereign’s - capacity to borrow from others. Hence, weSovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 3
will deﬁne a sovereign’s ability-to-pay to consist of the amount of actual forex
reserves and of its potential to attract capital. ¿From economic reasoning, we
know that the volume of potential net capital imports today is limited by the
volume of discounted future payment surpluses. Estimating these surpluses
by a simple time-series approach, we ﬁnally derive the levels as well as the
drift of the respective ability-to-pay process.
The process’ implicit volatility will be inferred from the price spreads in
the bond market being interpreted as a risk premium. To do so we adopt the
standard Black and Scholes framework. Based on these parameter estimates,
it is a straightforward exercise to calculate the sovereign’s PoD.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we modify the structural
approach, originally designed to valuate corporate liabilities, to capture the
risk of sovereign default. We close with a brief overview over related literature
based on option pricing models of sovereign risk. Section 3 deals with the
empirical application to calculate PoDs. We demonstrate the steps involved
for the case of Argentina 1994 - 2002 and discuss the relationship between
input data and PoDs. We extend our investigation to selected countries
in Latin America and to Russia. Adopting simple evaluation criteria, we
conclude that our model indicates default events well in advance, even when
compared to market signals and rating changes.4 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
2 A structural approach to sovereign risk
2.1 The structural approach to corporate risk
The structural approach to valuate corporate liabilities relies on the Merton
model as the fundamental contribution to this strand of literature. The
approach of Merton (1974) is inspired by the seminal paper on option
pricing by Black and Scholes (1973).
For the case of a stock option the following assumptions are made:
a) The short term interest rate is known and constant over time.
b) The stock price follows an Ito process. Hence, the distribution of the
stock prices is log-normal, the distribution of the returns is normal.
c) There are no dividends.
d) There are no transaction costs.
e) Borrowing any fraction of the underlying is possible, at the short term
interest rate.
f) There are no penalties to short selling.
g) The stock option can be exercised at maturity, only.
Black and Scholes (1973, p. 641) argue that for a (delta-) hedged
portfolio containing a long position in a stock and a short position in the
related call option, the drift rate equals the riskless interest rate, otherwise
arbitrage possibilities would result. This argument allows to derive a valua-
tion formula for European stock options.
Merton (1974) shows that this option pricing formula can be used to
valuate corporate liabilities as being contingent claims on the value of theSovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 5
ﬁrm. The value of the ﬁrm represents the underlying of the option contract
while the value of the repayment obligations is the strike price. Adopting the
assumptions of the Black Scholes model to the topic of corporate liabilities
allows to derive valuation formulas for both equity as well as liabilities. The
value of the equity is just the value of the call option on the ﬁrm’s value.
The value of the liabilities equals the value of a portfolio in the hand of the
creditor consisting of the ﬁrm’s value and a call option which is short sold.
Empirical applications of the Merton model are described e.g. in Saun-
ders (1999, p. 19 - 37) who also provides an outline of the KMV-Credit-
Monitor model well known among practitioners in the ﬁnancial sector. An-
other application is given by Delianedis and Geske (1998). Within this
type of models, the empirical estimation of the ﬁrm’s equity and its returns
is derived from the market prices of the stock. The volatility of the ﬁrm’s
equity is estimated by historical data on the ﬁrm’s equity. Solving a system
of stochastic diﬀerential equations ﬁnally leads to the value of the ﬁrm and to
its volatility. Thus, the value of the liabilities and the probability of default
of the ﬁrm are determined.6 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
2.2 Adapting the approach to sovereign risk
2.2.1 Macro fundamentals and the ability-to-pay
Sovereign risk is a complex issue not only because of missing ’market’ data
for a country’s net wealth, corresponding to the ﬁrm’s equity capital, but also
because of aggregating economic (solvency, liquidity), institutional (market
integration, cooperative enforcement) and political (willingness-to-pay, cred-
ibility) aspects (Cantor and Packer 1996). In general terms, it is the
repayment prospect (Fischer 1999) of outstanding claims which drives the
market perception of sovereign default. In our context, we disregard from
’unwillingness-to-pay’, an issue broadly discussed in the 1980ies but believed
to be of shrinking relevance due to the increasing integration of individual
sovereigns into the world economy (Rogoff 1999, p. 31). Instead, we focus
on the sovereign’s ability-to-pay at time t,At. Thereby, the ability-to-pay
is the maximum amount of foreign currency, say US Dollar, the sovereign
is able to dispose in order to meet his repayment obligations from borrow-
ing in foreign currency. At is composed of already existing forex holdings,
FX t, and the country’s potential to attract capital imports, KIt.F r o ma n
economic point of view, KIt will be limited by the sum of discounted future
payment surpluses (’net cash ﬂows’)NXt from exports Xt minus imports It.
We operationalize NXt by a simple autoregressive process and set KI as theSovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 7
corresponding steady-state capital ﬂow NX∗ discounted by an appropriate
interest rate ρrisk reﬂecting the market participants’ risk premium in lend-
ing to the sovereign. We approximate the risk adjusted discount factor by
selecting a sovereign bond of high liquidity and set ρrisk equal to the bond’s
eﬀective interest rate rrisk
t at time t. Formally:
Assumption 1: The sovereign’s ability-to-pay At is given by
At = FX t + KI
∗
t (1)
where FX t are the country’s foreign exchange reserves and
KI∗
t are the potential capital imports equating discounted








thereby, NX∗ is the steady-state value of the net exports
NXt := Xt − It which follow an AR(1) process
NXt = c0 + c1NXt−1 (3)
and the discount rate rrisk
t is the eﬀective interest rate of some
highly liquid sovereign bond.
Our procedure to operationalize potential capital import is merely some ﬁrst-
hand approximation for which other alternatives can be formulated. In prac-
titioners’ applications, private knowledge may become an important tool to8 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
valuate the potential of capital imports. Primarily, capital inﬂows are pro-
vided by investors who outweigh the country’s future exports. In addition
to these economically based capital inﬂows, the potential of international aid
based on political reasoning may also be taken into account.
We proceed in describing the sovereign’s debt structure and the repay-
ment perspectives for a sovereign bond traded in secondary markets to ma-
ture at time T. As the decision to default or not hinges on the principle
rather than on the coupon payments, we concentrate on zero bonds only. It
is often argued that seniorities are involved in serving repayment obligations.
Therefore, we assume default to occur if the sum of repayment obligations
till time T with priority higher or equal to the sovereign bond considered
exceeds the sovereign’s ability-to-pay. Or,
Assumption 2. There will be no repayments prior to T. The total
amount K of (net) repayment obligations (in international
currency) at T with priority higher or equal to the sovereign
zero-bond maturing at T is publicly observable. The sovereign
will default when holds
At <K . (4)
Relaxing assumption 2 of a single maturity and modelling the debt struc-
ture in more detail leads to more complex ’compound’ options, as described in
Geske (1977). There, for each maturity date, an option contract is speciﬁedSovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 9
whose strike price equals the respective repayment obligations. Alternatively,
the duration of the liabilities can be taken as a proxy (see Clark (1991, pp.
89) or Delianedis and Geske (1998)). As in general there is no public
information on the debt structure, both generalizations would need private
information to be implemented.
2.2.2 Market spreads and PoDs
There are two ways to explain the spread between the price of a risky and a
default-free bond. The cost-oriented approach explains the spread as equal
to the total costs for holding the risky bond. These costs include a risk
premium to account for default (see Edwards (1984) for an early approach).
The arbitrage-based approach explains the spread as the implicit price of an
insurance against default. This approach can be used after clariﬁcation of
the economic content of the sovereign’s ability-to-pay At. According to the
Black Scholes mechanism, we characterize the process (At) as follows:
Assumption 3: The ability-to-pay process (At)i sg i v e nb y
dAt = µAtdt + σAtdWt (5)
where µ and σ are constant and W is Brownian motion.
To derive a parameter estimation of the process’ drift µ we ﬁrst estimate
the expected continuously compounded rate µ∗ = µ − σ2/2 as follows.10 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
Assumption 4: An estimation of µ∗ is given by the log diﬀerences of
(At)a s
ˆ µ∗ = logA − logA−1 (6)
where A is the latest available data for the sovereign’s ability-
to-pay and A−1 is its realization lagged by one year.
To infer for σ, we again invoke the Black Scholes mechanism and assume
the existence of a risky and a secure bond with otherwise identical charac-
teristics, more precisely
Assumption 5: There are two types of zero bonds of identical maturity
T and identical face value Bt. Both are denominated in one
international currency, say US Dollar: risky bonds Brisk
t,T ,i s -
sued by a foreign sovereign or sovereign institution; and a
default-free bond Bsec
t,T, say US-T bonds, with interest rate r.
Non-arbitrage arguments immediately characterize the price a bondholder
is willing to pay for an insurance against default. Let us assume that there are
no further repayment obligations, i.e. K = BT. In this case, an international
investor who holds the entire stock of risky bonds would be willing to pay an
insurance against default at a price P which does not exceed the diﬀerence
Bsec − Brisk in stock values.
The value of such an insurance equals the value of a hypothetical put
option on the sovereign’s ability-to-pay where the volume of repayment re-Sovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 11
quirements is the strike price. This holds because the insurance and the put
option both have the same pay-oﬀ structure. Thereby, we assume that in
case of default the sovereign repays as much as he is able to do. In case
of non-default, there is no payment from the insurance. In case of default,
given our assumption, the insurance pays the diﬀerence K − AT between
the repayment requirements and the ability-to-pay at maturity time T.T h i s
contingent pay-oﬀ structure is identical to the pay-oﬀ function of the put.
Putting all together, we interpret the price spread between the secure bond
and the risky bond as the value of the hypothetical put option introduced
above.
Furthermore, if there are other repayment obligations of at least the same
priority involved, the bondholders hold only a fraction α = BT/K of the
relevant claims, and the diﬀerence in stock values reﬂects only the part αP
of total insurance against the sovereign default or
Assumption 6: Non-arbitrage between holding risky and secure bonds
holds. Hence, the price Pt,T of a (European) put option to
sell the total volume of risky claims with face value K at T is





t,T + αPt,T. (7)
In practical applications, starting with the price spread per unit of share,12 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
expressed as percentage points of the international currency unit, say bsec
t,T −
brisk
t,T , these percentage points have to multiplied by the total volume K of
repayment obligations to get the option price Pt,T.
Observing bond spreads in secondary markets and calculating the option
price Pt,T according to total repayment obligations K, we can use the Black
Scholes put price formula
Pt,T = Kexp(−r(T − t))N(−d2) − AtN(−d1)( 8 )
where
d1 =
ln(At/K)+( r + σ2





d2 = d1 − σ
√
T − t
to solve for σ as the market’s implicit volatility of the log returns of the
ability-to-pay process, by inserting the other input data t,T,r and At.G i v e n
estimates ˆ µ∗ and ˆ σ we ﬁnally get an estimate of the drift µ to be ˆ µ∗ +ˆ σ2/2.
Having identiﬁed the parameters µ and σ, the probability of default can
be calculated straight forward, using assumption 3, as
PoD = P(AT <K |At = A)( 9 )
= N0,1

ln(K/A) − (µ − σ2






Equation (9) represents a fundamental as well as market based quantiﬁ-Sovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 13
cation of sovereign risk which is based on fundamental data and on market
information.
2.3 Related literature on sovereign risk
We brieﬂy review some contributions to sovereign risk which also rely on
the structural approach. There are three main diﬀerences among models
covering sovereign risk. First, one has to specify the type of option (’put’ or
’call’) and the speciﬁc option pricing formula used. Second, the underlying
has to be determined empirically. This, of course, is the most challenging
part in any application and may be based on aspects like e.g. the capital
stock of a national economy or the solvency coeﬃcient. Third, the process’
characteristics have to be estimated. Especially, volatility estimates can be
derived either by using the past realizations of the underlying process or, as
implicit volatility, by using the market spreads.
One of the earlier, and remarkably elaborate, contributions is
Clark(1991). The focus is in valuating an European call which represents
the ’market value of the residents’ equity’. Thereby, the underlying is the
’market value of a national economy’, V , which is deﬁned as the cash ﬂows of
future net exports NX discounted at the economy’s rate of return r.F o r e x
reserves and their role are neglected thereby. To estimate r, and ﬁnally V ,14 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
the recursive equation: ∆V +NX = rV is regressed by rewriting the r.h.s. to
consists of a constant (steady-state) return c out of pre-sample period capital
stock and of a return rV   out of new capital stock V  . Next, the economy’s
annual rates of return are calculated as (∆V +NX)/V (Clark, 1991, p. 80-
81). This is somewhat inconsistent with the process’ characteristics implying
annual rates of ln(V/V−1) (see assumption 3 above). Finally, the volatility is
estimated by taking the standard deviation of the annual rate-of-return time
series. As an alternative volatility estimate, Clark (1991, p. 101-102) uses
the implicit volatility, similarly to our approach. To get somewhat consistent
volatility values, he calibrates the model by using diﬀerent collateralisation
levels transforming into diﬀerent strike prices for the economy.
Klein (1991) and Lichtlen (1997) both adopt a put approach to price
new credits or to valuate the fair risk premium for already existing loans.
Without employing an empirical application, Klein (1991) proposed a logit
approach to estimate the relationship between solvency ratios and funda-
mentals in order to forecast solvency ratios for new market entrants; thereby,
the solvency ratio is the ability-to-pay divided by the repayment require-
ments. He suggests to approximate the volatility of the underlying by the
standard deviation of the bond prices, an assumption which of course does
not completely conform with the referred framework. Lichtlen (1997) uses
rescheduling events, as documented in the World Bank’s ’World Debt Ta-Sovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 15
bles’/ resp. ’Global Development Finance’, to estimate a logit model of
rescheduling probabilities and its macroeconomic determinants. For any ten-
tative σ-value, the put option pricing formula allows to infer from estimated
rescheduling resp. default probabilities to the respective solvency ratios.
As the overall appropriate volatility value Lichtlen (1991, p. 167) ﬁnally
choses the one which minimizes on average the distance of volatility and the
standard deviation of the respective solvency ratios.
Claessens and Wijnbergen (1993) use a put option formula to price
outstanding debt and apply their approach to the question whether Mexico
or the international lending community did win from a Brady bond deal.
Their ’net amount of ﬁnancing to serve foreign debt’ consists of three ele-
ments: expected non-oil current account; adjustments to serve senior debt,
FDI and reserve accumulation; and expected oil earnings (Claessens and
Wijnbergen (1993, p. 971)). They approximate the volatility as the stan-
dard deviation of the forward prices for oil.
Karmann and Plate (2000) diﬀer from our approach mainly in the
deﬁnition of the underlying as forex reserves available to the debtor nation
which consist of actual reserves and the amount of net exports expected
till the expiration date (one year ahead). In another recent contribution,
Leerbass (1999) bases his notion of the underlying on a stock index of the
national economy, arguing that this would closely reﬂect discounted future16 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
GDP and thereby the economy’s ability-to-pay.
3 Evaluating the model
3.1 Input data generation
In our model, some data are available on an annual base, like forex reserves
or repayment requirements, others are given on a daily base, like bond prices
or interest rates (all data are taken from Data Stream ; the sample period
is begin of 1980 till end of January 2002). This comination deserves some
closer description on the generation of the ability-to-pay values.
For each year ty, the respective steady-state forecast NX∗ of net exports
will be estimated by regressing equation (3) with monthly data for exports
X and imports I for the sample period 1980.1 till end of the year ty − 1.
Using the coeﬃcient estimates ˆ c0 and ˆ c1 we get
NX
∗ ≡ ˆ c0/(1 − ˆ c1)( 3
 )
as the steady-state forecast for the year ty.
For any day td(ty) of the particular year ty we valuate the PoDs for exactly
one year ahead. Implicitly, this asks for considering risky and secure bonds
maturing at day td(ty + 1) and their spread. But, typically there are few,
or just one, risky bonds issued by the sovereign. We therefore meet theSovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 17
assumption that the term structure of the risk premium is ﬂat. The option
value Ptd(ty),td(ty+1) is now given by the relation
αPtd(ty),td(ty+1) = exp (−ln(1 + r
sec
td(ty),td(ty+1)) − (10)




Evaluating the performance of a method proposed to quantify risk needs a set
of explicitely deﬁned criteria and standards, as the Mathieson and Schi-
nasi (1999, Annex V, p. 192) point out. A straight forward condition is that
the approach taken has to clearly indicate default events by signalling them
well in advance. The second criterion is the performance of the approach in
comparison to markets and agencies. I.e. we have to relate our results on
PoDs with the movement of market spreads and with changes of ratings from
agencies, like S&P’s or Moody’s, or from market analysts, as represented by
Institutional Investor or Euromoney.
While we will take up this ﬁrst set of criteria in evaluating our approach,
there are some other criteria proposed in the literature which would deserve
a more detailed discussion about their appropriateness. PoDs could be trans-
formed into ones (’default’) and zeros (’non default’) by some threshold value,
say p =0 ,5, to count the hits and misses. This is a criterion well known in18 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
evaluating ’early warning’ systems. But one has to assign appropriate rela-
tive weights for type-I and type-II errors, a task which heavily depends on
the intended use of such a model: to maximize proﬁts or to minimize losses
from international portfolio investments. Another criterion is the degree of
correlation between sovereign PoDs and corporate defaults of the respective
countries. There should be a high correlation between the creditworthiness
of the sovereign and the one of the corporate sector (see Mathieson and
Schinasi (1999, p. 193)). Finally, the question arises how durable the PoD
signals are because frequent ’large’ jumps would aﬀect the predictive power
of the values derived from the model.
3.3 The case of Latin America and Russia
We start with the case of Argentina, ﬁnally rated as SD (’selected default’)
by S&P’s in Nov. 6, 2001, due to nonpayment on debt obligations. In ﬁg.
A.ARG.I, the PoDs are shown as calculated for the observation period from
begin of 1995 till Nov. 6, 2001. The relevant input data are presented in
ﬁg. A.ARG.II, containing the sovereign’s ability-to-pay At at date t and
the repayment obligations K for the respective year, and in ﬁg. A.ARG.III,
containing the market spread between the risky and the secure asset.
To analyse the PoDs of Argentina, we distinguish 5 diﬀerent periods ofSovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 19
time:
1. 1995 where PoDs are at a high level of 20 - 35 %.
2. 1996/97 where PoDs are at a low level of 5 %.
3. 1998/99 where PoDs are at a level of 20 - 30 %, with a Peak of nearly
50 % in autumn 1998.
4. 2000/2001 where PoDs vary between 40- 50 %.
5. Since July 2001 where PoDs remain at a 50 % level.
In 1995, our macro fundamentals suggest a ’non critical’ economic sit-
uation. The high PoD levels mainly reﬂect the high risk premia prevalent
in many bond markets just after the Mexican crisis. Indead, the fear of
contagion is a phenomenon not limited to the Tequila crisis but observed
also during the Asian crisis (see e.g. Karmann, Gressmann and Hott
(2002) quantifying contagion for Asia). In 1996/97, the former tension in
bond markets calmed down lowering the spreads for Argentinian dollar-
denominated bonds. On the other side, increasing repayment obligations
were fully matched by the sovereign’s ability-to-pay which improved within
this period of time. The resulting PoD levels of around 5 % increased since
October 1997. This was a consequence of rising risk premia during the Asian
crisis reﬂecting the market’s fear that the Asian crisis may aﬀect Argentina.20 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
The period 1998/99 is characterized by two countervailing eﬀects. The
trend of increasing repayment obligations remained valid but the sovereign’s
ability-to-pay shrunk due to deteriorating net exports perspectives NX.
Hence, PoD levels rose to reach around 30%. The Russia crisis of mid 1998
drove PoDs up to some 50%, a consequence mainly of the considerable in-
crease in market spreads.
In 2000, news on macro-fundamentals let jump the PoD to levels between
40 and 50 % when repayment obligations now nearly coincided with the
sovereign’s ability-to-pay and the drift became negative. In contrast, the
market spreads did not react signiﬁcantly until July 2001. Then the spread
increase rapidly. As a consequence the PoD remains at a level of about 50%.
To evaluate the explanatory power of our model for Argentina, we con-
centrate on the co-movements of PoD ﬁgures and rating changes. Starting
in 1995, Argentina, rated as BB−, improved considerably in terms of calcu-
lated PoDs well in advance of the subsequent upgrading in April 2nd, 1997.
Two quarters later, our PoDs indicate growing concern on repayment per-
spectives. News on fundamentals at the end of the year 2000 may have led
S&P’s to downgrade Argentina, by a slight change to BB− in November
14th, 2000, to be followed by further downgradings during 2001 till SD. Our
PoDs, when updated with the news available end of the year 2000, already
suggest that the risk of default within a on-year period is high. While ourSovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 21
PoDs react well in advance of rating changes they also lead w.r.t. market
spreads as the period from December 1998 till end of the year 2000 shows
when markets did not react.
We complete our exercise by investigating PoDs for two sovereigns,
Ecuador and Russia, having defaulted and for two countries, Chile and
Venezuela, not having defaulted in the entire period 1995 - 2002.
The case of Ecuador is somewhat between fundamental crisis and mar-
ket herding. Ecuador defaulted on Brady bonds in July 27th, 2000. In
October 1st, 1999 the government announced ﬁrst-time that it will be un-
able to fulﬁll the repayment obligations in the future (see http://www.east-
west.be/news4.htm1#F). In advance the PoD reaches a level of about 50 %.
In Juli 2000, when Ecuador in fact defaulted, our model predicted a PoD of
around 60 % after starting at a close to 8 % level in April 1998 (earlier data
were not available). As there is no sovereign rating by S&P’s we concentrate
on comparing PoDs and market spreads. The increase of calculated PoDs
is, at ﬁrst, a direct consequence of increasing spreads during the Russia cri-
sis. It is enforced by fundamentals deteriorating since early 1999, in terms
of decreasing expected ﬂows NX, a negative drift - expressing on-average
negative returns - and a higher discounting. As the latter expresses market
expectations, we conclude that our model and the market both are signaling
an increasingly risky situation during the nine-month period prior to default.22 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
The case of Russia seems to be more a matter of perceived credibility.
Though macro fundamentals remained unchanged and forex reserves accu-
mulation (12,2 bill. USD) nearly covered repayment obligations (13 bill.
USD), the expected net exports (10 bill. USD) were discounted by the mar-
ket at extremely high rates. This implicitly means that market belief strongly
limited the sovereign’s potential to borrow from international markets, re-
gardless of solvency aspects. In contrast to Argentina and Ecuador, there
was a rapid and remarkable increase of PoDs before default was announced
by August 17th, 1998.
Does this mean that markets have not foreseen default and/or fundamen-
tals did not react properly? A closer analysis of the PoDs and the input data
reveals that during the year 1997, the PoD was around 2%. This corresponds
to the observed lending boom during that period (see Semenkov (2000, p.
27)). At the end of 1997, the POD increased to a level of about 5% together
with a slight increase in the market spread which lowered the sovereign’s
ability-to-pay. News on macro fundamentals at the beginning of 1998 led to
lower solvency ratios while spreads remained unchanged till mid of the year.
The following increase of the PoDs, starting with values between 5% and
10% during the ﬁrst six months to increase to 20% by August 1st and ﬁnally
to 80% till the date of default, was merely driven by the increase of spreads
from a 10% level to a 65% level.Sovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 23
Putting together, news on fundamentals of Russia at the beginning of
1998 directed PoDs to react somewhat in advance before half-a-year later
market participants started to panic. Like in a second generation crisis model
(see e.g. Obstfeld (1984)), expectations of market participants switched to
drive the economy towards the bad equilibrium. W.r.t. rating changes we see
that the process of downgrading began in June 9th, 1998 when our PoDs were
already back at some 25% level. Even one week before the announcement
of default, Russia was still related as B+ while our PoD levels had already
reached some 50 % (August 11th, 1998).
Chile represents the case of a sovereign without any default and without
any change of rating during the entire period since bond data are available.
Macro fundamentals indicate a solvency ratio of as large as 3. As expected,
net exports are negative here, in this case the ability-to-pay just consists of
the country’s foreign exchange reserves. The calculated PoDs seem to be
in a reasonable range of 4 - 8% according to low spreads (1,5 - 2,0%) which
had been unaﬀected even by the Argentina crisis. Venezuela is a similar case.
There is no sovereign default in terms of nonpayments on governmental bonds
though, admittedly, there are considerable arrears over a long period of time
resulting from non-repayments by some governmentally owned steel manufac-
turers. Venezuela’s solvency ratio is at least as large as the corresponding one
of Chile but market spreads are higher and also reﬂect contagion fears during24 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
the Tequila crisis and the Russia crisis. Consistently, the PoDs of Venezuela
are higher than the ones of Chile, well in line with a sovereign rating below
the grade of A− for Chile. But, comparing the co movement between PoDs
and rating grades the decision of S&P’s to downgrade Venezuela by Februar
23rd, 1996, seems to be questionable in the light of our data indicating con-
siderably reduced PoDs of less than 5%. But also the process thereafter of
successive upgrading by S&P’s is not supported directly by our PoDs which
remain within a range of 5 - 10% since 1996.
4 Summary
We presented a model to compute the probability of default of sovereigns
on their foreign exchange liabilities. The ability-to-pay of a sovereign results
from the existing foreign exchange reserves and the potential of possible
capital imports which are approximated using a time series model. For the
development of the ability-to-pay, a stochastic process of the Ito type is
assumed. We estimate the volatility of the process by applying the Black
Scholes formula for put options to the price-spreads on the bond markets.
Thereby, the price-spread between a bond regarded as free of default risk and
a risky bond issued by the sovereign of a developing country is interpreted
as risk premium for the risk of default.Sovereign Risk in a Structural Approach 25
The computed probability of default depends on macro economic fun-
damentals which primarily determine the ability-to-pay. In addition, data
from the international capital markets are used. These market data re-
ﬂect the risk assessment of the market participants so that they are well
capable for estimating the volatility as the risk parameter of the process.
Our approach is applied to some countries. The probabilities of de-
fault determined so far are discussed in detail. It is shown that a strong
rise of the computed probabilities of default precedes the occurrence of
default in each case. Also related events, like ﬁnancial crises in other
countries, are reﬂected by the model. Furthermore, we see that the
computed probabilities of default run clearly ahead of rating migrations.
Thus, we conclude that our model seems to be well convenient to deter-
mine the sovereign probability of default, whereby areas for future research
remain, like the prediction of future payment surpluses.26 A. Karmann and D. Maltritz
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